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be used to evaluate a variety of policy proposals, such as caps on size or leverage, mergers of good
and bad banks, and equity injections. We then apply the framework to measure (a) the vulnerability
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1. Introduction
Financial stress experienced by financial institutions can contaminate others and spiral into a shock
which threatens the entire financial system: this is systemic risk. The measurement of systemic risk
has been high on financial regulators’ priority list since the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, which
triggered widespread financial distress among large US financial institutions. The recent sovereign
debt crisis and corresponding concerns about the solvency of European banks system have only made
the need to measure system-wide stability more acute.
Two forms of linkages between financial institutions can create contagion. The first relies on
contractual dependencies: when two banks write a financial contract such as a swap agreement, a
negative shock to one bank can transmit to the other party as soon as one of the banks is unable
to honor the contract (e.g., Allen and Babus 2009, Gorton and Metrick 2010, Giglio, 2011). Such
bilateral links can create a channel for the propagation of financial distress, because the creditor
bank may in turn default on its obligations to third parties (Duffie 2010, Kallestrup et al., 2011).1 A
second propagation mechanism comes from fire-sale spillovers: When an institution is forced to sell
illiquid assets, it depresses prices, which in turn can prompt financial distress at other institutions
holding these same assets. Such liquidation spirals have been explored in an extensive theoretical
literature.2 In a system of greater complexity, such spirals are believed by numerous economists and
policy-makers to have become an important vector of systemic risk over the recent decades (Schwarcz,
2008).
This paper proposes a parsimonious and tractable model of this fire-sales channel of systemic
risk. The main benefit of this framework is that it can easily be estimated with available data, used
to evaluate systemic risk and simulate policy experiments. The model takes as given (1) the assets
holdings of each financial institution, (2) a liquidation rule applied by institutions when they are
hit by adverse shocks and (3) the liquidity of these assets on the secondary market. Using these
three ingredients, we can compute how asset shocks impact leverage, liquidation, price impact, and
finally the equity value of financial institutions. We derive closed form formulas for (a) the impact of
shocks on the overall financial sector via fire-sales spillovers (“aggregate vulnerability”, our measure of
systemic risk); (b) the separate impact of each individual institution’s liquidation on the overall value
of the financial sector (“systemicness”); and (c) the impact of shocks on each institution separately
(“vulnerability”). The model therefore makes a clear distinction between financial intermediaries that
are hurt by deleveraging (“vulnerable”), and financial intermediaries that contribute to aggregate
1Kalemli-Ozcan(2011) investigate the impact of inter-bank linkages on business cycle synchronization.
2See for instance Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2010), Gromb and Vayanos (2007), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2011), Wagner (2011).
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deleveraging (“systemic”). It also delivers a number of intuitive properties concerning how the
distribution of leverage and risk exposures across banks determines systemic risk. First, a negative
return shock experienced by an asset held by relatively levered institutions has a larger aggregate
impact. Second, the system is less stable when asset classes that are large tend to be held by highly
levered entities. Third, assets which are both volatile and illiquid should be dispersed across banks,
since shocks generate less high price impact deleveraging this way. In contrast, if illiquid assets have
low price volatility, then it is better to isolate these assets in separate banks, so that they are not
contaminated by other assets that are subject to larger shocks.
Though highly stylized, our framework can be used to simulate the outcome of various policy
proposals to mitigate systemic risk. First, it allows to evaluate the overall impact of the failure of
a given bank on each other member of the financial system. Second, the model can also simulate
the effect of a size cap or forced bank mergers. These policies affect systemic risk because they
redistribute existing assets held by large intermediaries to other intermediaries, which may have
different exposures to shocks, different size, or different leverage. The model also allows to investigate
the potential impact of a leverage cap: such a policy has the power to reduce the sensitivity of
intermediaries’ fire sales to shocks, but at the cost of substituting debt for equity. Last, the model
also allows to explore the features and gains of an “optimal” equity injection, i.e. debt-equity swaps
targeted to minimize the aggregate impact of deleveraging. In our framework, “microprudential”
stabilization policies, which aim to fix insolvency at weaker banks, are almost always inferior to
“macroprudential” policies which target the cross-bank spillovers directly. Put differently, optimal
injections should not target banks that are directly exposed to the shock, but banks whose liquidations
have the largest impact on others (high “systemicness”).
We explore two concrete applications. First, we calibrate the model on European banks during
the 2010-2011 sovereign debt crisis. For a large set of European banks, we have good measures of risk
exposures derived from the European Banking Authority’s July 2011 stress tests. The results of these
tests include a set of exposures to sovereign default in a number of countries (e.g., Greece). We then
use these exposures to estimate the potential spillovers which could occur during bank deleveraging.
Our analysis uncovers some interesting and worrisome linkages. For example, only a few banks have
direct exposure to a Greek sovereign default. However, a much larger group of banks are indirectly
exposed, because they hold assets which are held by the banks which are directly exposed to Greek
sovereign bonds. In the extreme event of a bank failure of a directly exposed bank, these indirectly
exposed banks would suffer portfolio losses as well. Using the risk exposures as inputs, we document
a correlation between our estimates of vulnerability and equity drawdowns experienced by European
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banks in 2010 and 2011. We then use our data to evaluate various policy actions which have the
potential to reduce systemic risk. We find that size caps, or forced mergers among the most exposed
entities, do not reduce systemic risk very much. However, we show that modest equity injections, if
distributed appropriately between the most systemic banks, can cut the vulnerability of the banking
sector by more than half.
We then apply our framework to the US financial crisis of 2007-2009. In contrast to Europe, we do
not have direct measures of exposures of financial intermediaries to different assets, and thus estimate
these exposures from equity returns. Despite this limitation, we find that our model performs well on
three dimensions: (1) it captures the pre-Lehman build-up in financial instability, (2) it predicts the
magnitude of the impact of Lehman’s failure on the other banks, and (3) it predicts the maximum
equity drawdown experienced by each bank during the financial crisis. These results obtain in spite
of coarse estimates of each institution’s holdings: a regulator in possession of detailed information on
bank holdings could in principle do better. Last, we use the calibrated framework to investigate the
systemic impact of various policies, fictitious (a $500bn price cap) and real (the WaMu - JP Morgan
merger).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We provide a short literature review in
Section 2. In Section 3, we develop the model, solve it, and develop intuitions for financial sector
stability under different configurations of leverage and risk exposure across banks. In Section 4,
we use commercial bank exposures provided by the EBA’s July 2011 stress tests to compute the
vulnerability of European banks to sovereign defaults. In Section 5, we test the basic framework on
US financial institutions (not just commercial banks), where we rely on historical equity returns to
back out exposures. Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Our paper belongs to a growing empirical literature on systemic risk. Our main contribution is that
we focus on fire sales as the channel for contagion, and we use an economic model to calibrate the
contagion across financial institutions.
The recent tradition in recent papers on systemic risk has been to infer bank linkages from market
price correlations. A first set of papers seeks to estimate risk from bond or CDS data (see for instance
Ang and Longstaff (2011)). A recent contribution is Giglio (2011), who uses the difference between
bond and CDS spreads (market estimates of counterparty risk) to estimate the joint probability
that large banks (who act as CDS sellers) go broke. A second and larger set of papers measures
systemic risk through comovement in the portfolios of various intermediaries, measured via equity
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returns (see, for instance, Billio et al (2010) and references therein). Two recent contributions focus
on the extent to which financial intermediaries comove in the tail of the distribution. Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2010) measure the Value at Risk of the whole financial sector conditional on a given
institution being in distress. They rely on quantile regressions and historical data on stock returns
to estimate the comovement of financial institutions under stress. In our model, “systemicness” (the
effect of each institution on system-wide deleveraging, see Section 3.2.2) puts an economic structure
on their CoVaR measure. On the other hand, Acharya et al. (2010) propose a measure closer to our
concept of “vulnerability” (the effect of shocks on each bank individually, see Section 3.2.3). For each
financial institution, they calculate the average of returns during the 5% worst market days. This
captures the extent to which an institution performs in adverse market conditions. Like our measure
of vulnerability, their measure predicts the cross-section of financial institutions’ stock-returns during
the crisis. Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2010) measure systemic risk using bilateral time-series
dependencies between firms (see also Diebold and Yilmaz (2011)): because they identify networks,
their approach is an important input for our US application. Our “cross-bank vulnerability” (effect
of one bank to another, see Section 3.2.4) provide a possible economic foundation of Billio et al’s
bilateral connections.
We depart from this literature by making a few simple assumptions about the structure of the
propagation of funding shocks across banks. The cost of this approach is that we adopt a narrower
definition of systemic risk based on asset liquidation. The main benefit is that our model-based
approach is to quite easy to use to do policy analysis. Another key benefit of our economic structure
that we impose is that we can distinguish between a bank’s contribution to the risk of aggregate
deleveraging (“systemicness”), and that bank’s sensitivity to deleveraging by other banks (“vulner-
ability”). Clearly, a bank can be quite vulnerable to deleveraging even if it does not pose much of a
risk to the banking system (for example if the bank is small but highly levered). Note also that the
economic structure we use in our model is similar to Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010),
who focus on the propagation of industry shocks in the real economy. They derive conditions under
which the propagation mechanism is so strong that aggregate volatility remains high even when the
network is large. Assuming their asymptotic approximation is correct for some 100 banks, some of
their insights could be applied here to measure systemic fragility, but our goal in this paper is to
calibrate/estimate the network and use it to make policy simulations (an issue they do not look at).
Last, our analysis is closely related to policy proposals recently put forth by Duffie (2011) and
Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2011). Duffie (2011) proposes that a core group of large
financial firms report for a list of stressful scenarios their gains or losses together with the large
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counterparties with whom the gain or loss for that scenario is the largest. Brunnermeier, Gorton,
and Krishnamurthy (2011) suggest eliciting firms’ sensitivities to different risk factors and scenarios.
Our paper is a first attempt to use simplified economic behaviors to model these sensitivities, and to
quantify how these stress scenarios could play out across the broader financial sector.
3. A Model of Bank Deleveraging
We start by describing the model. We then use it to derive easy-to-implement measures of systemic
risk, at the bank and aggregate levels. We close the section by providing intuitions about how the
distribution of size, leverage, and risk exposures in the system impacts systemic risk in our model.
3.1. Bank Risk Exposures and Deleveraging Behavior
t is the time subscript. There are N banks, each indexed by i. Each bank holds a portfolio of K
assets which is financed with a mix of debt di and equity ei. The total value of bank i’s portfolio
of assets is ai. The returns of the K underlying assets is given the random K × 1 vector Ft. M
is the N × K matrix of banks’ returns exposure to the various assets. Then, the vector of banks’
(unlevered) portfolio returns Rt is given by:
Rt = MFt + t, (1)
where t is a vector of idiosyncratic shocks.
To model the propagation of shocks through assets liquidations, we need to define (1) the total
dollar amount sold by each bank following the shock and (2) in what proportion each asset is sold,
and last (3) the price-impact of asset sales. In practice, more complex assumptions can be made on
each of these three dimensions: For instance, in the Section 4.5, we explore an alternative liquidation
rule to that of the canonical model, whereby liquidations are restricted to the most liquid class of
assets.
Assumption 1: Size of Asset Sales: Leverage Targeting
When banks experience shocks to their net worth, we assume that they respond by scaling up or
down their assets to maintain a fixed level of leverage. Such leverage-targetting is in line with Adrian
and Shin (2010), who show that banks manage leverage to offset shocks to their assets’ values.3 Let
3They provide evidence that commercial banks target a constant leverage ratio, while investment banks have procyclical
leverage, which means that their leverage adjustments more than offset the changes in leverage induced by shocks to asset
values.
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B be the N ×N diagonal matrix such that Bii is the desired ratio of debt to equity of a given bank,
i.e., Bii = di/ei. Let At be the N × N diagonal matrix such that Aii,t = ai,t is equal to the total
assets in dollars of bank i.
Assume a bank experiences an unlevered return of Ri,t−1, but seeks to maintain its target leverage
at Bii. In this case, it is easy to show that the bank will have to scale up its assets by BiiAii,t−1Ri,t−1.
For example, suppose a bank with equity of 1 and debt of 9 experiences a 10% return on its assets,
bringing its equity to 2. The bank will have to borrow an additional 9 and buy assets to return to
the prior leverage of 9-to-1.4 Hence, if we define φ as the vector of net inflows of capital required to
maintain constant leverage:
φt = At−1BRt−1. (2)
When φ < 0, this means that banks with negative asset returns have to sell assets to deleverage.5
In writing Eq. (2) we implicitly assume that banks do not raise equity in response to a negative
shock. While the assumption is extreme, the basic analysis does not change if we instead assume
that banks return to target leverage using a combination of asset sales and equity issues in fixed
proportion. In this case, the magnitude of our results is dampened by the willingness to issue equity.
We note, however, that in situations where debt overhang is severe, banks will be unwilling to raise
new equity without government intervention, and thus our analysis serves as a useful benchmark.
We also abstract away from the specific dynamics of the adjustment process, which could be quite
slow if the bank is reluctant to recognize losses. The analysis remains qualitatively identical if banks
return only partially to their leverage target.
Equation (2) is only valid as long as fire-sales are less than the bank’s total assets. When the bank
shock ri is very large, the bank may be induced to sell all of its assets ai(1 + ri): this happens every
time ri < − 1(bi−1) . In this case, we modify the behavior described in equation (2) by positing that
the bank sells all of its assets ai, and nothing more. Formally, calling “max” the point-wise maximum
matrix operator, defined by max(X,Y ) = (max(Xi, Yi)), we obtain the following expression for the
fire-sales vector:
Φt = At−1 ×max(BR,−1−R). (3)
This is the formula we will use in our European application, because we study large shocks
4Essentially we are treating banks as similar to leveraged exchange traded funds (ETFs) which must readjust to their
target leverage at the close of trading each day.
5See Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008) and Adrian and Shin (2009) for further discussion of this point and
related evidence.
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there. In our US application, equation (2) will be enough, since we study small shocks (one standard
deviation). To simplify exposition, we will make a slight abuse of notation and present the rest of
our results using the linear model (2).
Assumption 2: Composition of Asset Sales
Which of their assets do banks sell when they deleverage? The second main assumption of the
model is that banks sell (or buy) the different assets in proportion to their dollar holdings, so as to
keep their exposures (as defined by the M matrix) relative to total assets constant. For example, if
a bank portfolio consists of 10 percent cash, 20 percent in stocks and 70 percent in mortgage backed
securities, if the bank scales down its portfolio by ten units, it will sell 2 units of stocks, 7 units of
mortgage backed securities, and take its cash down by 1.6 Accordingly, let φki,t denote bank i’s the
dollar net buys of asset k, so that φi,t =
∑
k φ
k
i,t. To maintain constant relative dollar exposures, net
buys of asset k must satisfy:
φki,t = mikφi,t, (4)
where we implictly assume that the bank holds a fraction 1−∑kmki of cash, which it buys or sells
like the other assets. In vector terms, the K × 1 vector of total net dollar order purchases is given
by M ′φt.
Assumption 3: Price Impact of Asset Sales
We make the reduced-form assumption that asset sales generate price impact according to:
Ft = LM
′φt, (5)
where L is a diagonal matrix of price impact ratios, expressed in units of returns per dollar of net
purchase. For instance, Pulvino (1998) estimates the discount associated with fire sales of commercial
aircraft by distressed airlines. In equity markets, Coval and Stafford (2007) estimate the L coefficient
using forced purchases and sales of stock by mutual funds (see also Ellul et al, 2011, and Jotikasthira
et al, 2011 who use similar methodologies in other asset markets).
Given these three assumptions, the model is solved by combining equations (5), (2) and (1). Let
S be the vector of shocks to assets in t− 1, then, returns Rt should be given by:
6This assumption has been widely used in the mutual fund literature: investor flows have been shown to cause mutual
funds to scale up and down their portfolios, but otherwise keep their portfolio weights constant. See Coval and Stafford
(2007), Greenwood and Thesmar (2010), and Lou (2011). We have experimented with more complicated liquidation rules,
in which banks first rank assets by liquidity, and start selling their most liquid assets first, or equivalently drawing down
their cash assets before engaging in asset sales. While this analysis yields some additional theoretical insights, it is less
amenable to calibration in our data.
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Rt = (MLM
′BAt−1)× S. (6)
In principle, one can iterate for multiple rounds of deleveraging following an initial shock through
further multiplying by MLM ′BAt−1. In this paper, we restrict our attention to the first round.
3.2. Measuring Systemic Risk
We use Equations (1) through (5) to derive four measures of bank vulnerability and systemic risk
that capture the contagion effect of bank deleveraging.
3.2.1. Aggregate vulnerability
Let us first define the direct effect of a shock S. The response of bank returns is given by MS. By
pre-multiplying this vector by aggregate bank assets 1′At−1, we obtain the aggregate dollar direct
impact of the shock, which is 1′At−1MS. This direct effect does not involve any contagion between
banks. The direct effect can also be expressed as a levered equity return by pre-multiplying by B,
i.e., BAt−1MS.
Following equation (6), the dollar effect of shock S on bank assets through fire-sales is given
by premultiplying MLM ′BAt−1MS by 1′At−1. We normalize this by total bank equity and define
“aggregate vulnerability” as:
AV =
1′At−1MLM ′BAt−1MS
Et−1
, (7)
AV measures the percentage of aggregate bank equity that would be wiped out by banks’ subsequent
deleveraging if there was a shock S to economic factors. Note that this formula crucially omits the
direct impact of the shock on net worth, thereby emphasizing only the spillovers across banks. If
all assets are perfectly liquid (i.e., all elements of the L matrix are zero), then AV = 0: there is no
fire-sales and therefore no contagion, even though there is still a direct effect BAt−1MS. on equity
returns.
To understand the core intuitions of our model, using R = MS, we can expand Equation (7):
AV × Et−1 =
∑
i,j,k
(
ai,t−1mi,klkmj,kbjaj,t−1rj
)
=
∑
k
[(∑
i
mi,kai,t−1
)(∑
i
lkmi,kbiai,t−1ri
)]
. (8)
where ri is the i
th element of bank return vector R. Suppose that bank j is impacted by a return
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shock rj < 0, so its total assets go down by ajrj dollars. To maintain target leverage, that bank thus
has to liquidate a dollar amount bjajrj . A fraction mj,k of that amount will be in asset k, leading to
a return impact of liquidation (lkmj,k)bjajrj on asset k. Bank i, which owns mi,kai dollars of this
asset k will make a loss equal to mi,kaimj,kajbjrj . Our measure of aggregate vulnerability adds up
across all assets and banks these liquidation-generated losses.
The expansion in Eq. (8) highlights another key feature of our model: vulnerability is high when
asset classes for which aggregate dollar holdings
∑
imi,kai are large are also assets which are held
by large, levered highly exposed banks
∑
imi,kaibiri.
With constant leverage (b = b∗) and constant shocks across banks (ri = r for all i), the distribution
of assets across banks does not matter for aggregate vulnerability. In particular, having all assets in
one bank, or having assets equally distributed across banks does not change aggregate vulnerability
since the fire sale spillovers add up linearly. The distribution of assets across banks matters only
when leverage or portfolio composition (M) differ across banks.
Our AV measure does not take into account the fact that shocks to various assets are correlated.
One way to do this is to calculate the variance of the aggregate deleveraging effect 1′At−1MLM ′BAt−1s˜,
where s˜ is the realization of a random shock to banks’ assets. Let Ω be the variance-covariance ma-
trix of these shocks, whose off-diagonal elements represent the typical comovements in assets returns.
Then, the variance of fire-sale induced bank shocks is given by
(
1′At−1MLM ′BAt−1M
Et−1
)
Ω
(
1′At−1MLM ′BAt−1M
Et−1
)′
.
This measure captures the fact that shocks may occur simultaneously, and therefore have multiplica-
tive impact on banks’ assets. We do not study it in the present paper, but will do it in future
work.
3.2.2. Systemic Banks
We can calculate the contribution that each bank has– through liquidation spirals – on the aggregate
value of the banking system. To do this, we again focus on the impact of a shock to factors S,
but assume it only affects bank i. In this case, it is easy to see that the impact coming from the
liquidations of bank i on the aggregate of the banking system is:
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S(i) =
1′At−1MLM ′BAt−1eie′iMS
Et−1
(9)
= bi ×
(
ai,t−1
E
)
× (eiMS)× (1′At−1MLM ′ei) (10)
= bi︸︷︷︸
Higher leverage
· ai,t−1
Et−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Size
·
(∑K
k=1
mi,ksk
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exposure to shocked assets
·
∑K
k=1
lkmi,k
(∑N
j=1
aj,t−1mj,k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Holds illiquid assets held by rest of system
(11)
where ei is the vector with all zeros except for the i
th element, which is equal to 1. We call S(i) the
“systemicness” of bank i.
Eq. (11) shows that a bank can be more systemic for four distinct reasons:
• It is more levered: A shock to a more levered bank is going to induce it to sell more, which
generates more price-impact.
• It is bigger: A given shock on a larger bank leads to more fire sales which in turn leads to a
large price impact.
• Is is more exposed to shocked assets: If this is the case, a given factor shock will lead to more
deleveraging, which increases the price impact.
• It is more connected: This happens when bank i owns more illiquid assets held by other
banks. In our approach of systemic risk, contagion occurs through liquidation spirals; thus
interconnections through common holdings are weighted by illiquidity. This is the meaning of
the last term in Eq. (11).
Note that aggregate vulnerability is simply the sum over all banks of their systemicness, i.e.,
AV =
∑
i S(i). Hence, systemicness can be interpreted as the contribution of each bank to aggregate
vulnerability.
3.2.3. Vulnerable Banks
A bank’s systemicness is not the same as its exposure to the deleveraging of other banks. We define
a bank’s “vulnerability” as the impact of deleveraging on its equity:
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V (i) =
e′iAt−1MLM
′BAt−1MS
Ei,t−1
(12)
= (1 + bi)×
(
e′iMLM
′BAt−1MS
)
(13)
= (1 + bi)×
∑K
k=1
[
mi,k
(∑N
j=1
lkmj,kbjaj,t−1rj
)]
. (14)
V (i) represents the effect of the aggregate shock on bank i as a percentage of its equity. The first term
stands for the pure leverage effect: a more levered bank is more vulnerable. The second term measures
the importance of connections between banks. The price impact on asset k of deleveraging by all
banks is
(∑N
j=1 lkmj,kbjaj,t−1rj
)
. These price impacts are then multiplied by bank i’s exposure: an
individual bank’s vulnerability to deleveraging risk depends on its leverage and exposures to illiquid
factors that lots of other highly levered banks are exposed to.
For each bank, it is natural to compare “vulnerability” and “direct exposure”, which can be
calculated by pre-multiplying MS by e′iAt−1. Direct exposure e
′
iAt−1MS measures the immediate
impact of the shock on bank i, while vulnerability captures the indirect effect of fire-sales spillovers.
3.2.4. Cross-Bank Vulnerability
So far we have emphasized vulnerability to deleveraging occurring because a broad set of banks
receives a set of potentially correlated shocks. A special case of this is to compute the vulnerability of
a bank to liquidations induced by a negative shock to any another bank. We later do this empirically
where we estimate the impact of the Lehman Brothers failure on other US banks. The impact of a
σ % shock to bank j’s assets on the assets of bank i, normalized by bank i’s equity is given by:
V (i, j) = σ × e
′
iAt−1MLM
′BAt−1ej
Ei,t−1
(15)
= σ × bj × aj,t−1 × (1 + bi)× e′iMLM ′ej (16)
= σ × bj × aj,t−1 × (1 + bi)×
(∑K
k=1
lkmi,kmjk
)
. (17)
The four terms can be interpreted as follows. If bank j (the sender of the shock) is bigger or more
levered, its dollar impact on each bank i will be bigger. This is because bank j will have to sell
a larger quantity of assets. The first two terms are the same for all receiving banks i. The third
component measures the leverage effect on bank i. Since fire sales by bank j impact the assets of i,
their impact on equity value will be bigger if the bank is more levered. The last term measures the
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liquidity weighted linkages between banks i and j. It is large when holdings of illiquid assets by i
and j are more similar.
3.3. Determinants of Banking System Vulnerability
Here we illustrate how the distribution of size, leverage, and risk exposures across banks contributes
to systemic risk. To fix ideas, we set n = K = 2, i.e., two banks and two assets (1 and 2). Dollar
holdings of assets are given by H1 = H2 = H. We define lk as the price impact associated with asset
k (return effect of one dollar of net buys). sk is the shock to asset k and bi is the debt-equity ratio
of bank i. For any variable x, we follow the convention that x∗ = (x1 + x2) /2.
3.3.1. Systems in which banks have identical leverage
To fix ideas, we first study the case where banks have identical leverage. We consider two polar cases:
“identical” banks and “unrelated” banks. Identical banks have the same portfolios, i.e. M identical =
1
211
′.7 Unrelated banks are such that bank i owns all of asset i, and only asset i. Hence, Munrelated =
I. In both cases, both banks have the same size, H, hence A = H.I.
These two banking systems have different aggregate vulnerabilities. Plugging both values of M
into equation (6) leads to:
 AV identical = b∗H2 · 2l∗s∗AV unrelated = b∗H2 · (l1s1 + l2s2)
Our measure of systemic risk yields a different insight from the existing literature. Most existing
methodologies are based on returns correlation: According to them, the “identical bank” system,
with its two clones, has more systemic risk than the “unrelated banks” system, whose historical
return correlations are lower. In our framework, systemic risk can actually be lower with identical
banks. From the above equations, we obtain:
AV Same < AV Segregated ⇔ (l1 − l2)(s1 − s2) > 0. (18)
, i.e. making the banks more similar makes the system stronger when the less liquid (higher l) asset is
subject to the strongest shocks (higher s). Spreading the shocked asset across banks is good because
banks can then respond to this shock by fire-selling other assets, instead of just selling the shocked
assets. An unrelated system thus reduces the price impact on the shocked assets, but increases it on
7Indeed, if we call m = m1,1 = m2,1, then m1,2 = m2,2 = 1−m and the total quantity of asset 1 is m(A1 + A2) = H,
while that of asset 2 is (1−m)(A1 + A2) = H, which finally implies m = 1/2.
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other assets. Whether the “spreading-out” effect dominates the “contamination” effect depends on
whether the shocked assets are more or less liquid than the other assets. This is what condition (18)
shows.
3.3.2. Heterogeneous leverage
We now assume that b1 < b2. As previously, we can compute AV for identical and unrelated banks.
We also introduce a third case, “one bank”, where all assets are parked in the least levered bank
(bank 1). We obtain:

AV identical = 2H2 × b∗l∗s∗
AV one bank = 2H2 × b1s∗l∗
AV unrelated = 2H2 × ( l1b1s1+l2b2s22 ) .
The above algebra yields several insights. First, since b1 < b
∗, putting all assets under the
umbrella of the lowest levered bank is more stabilizing than splitting them equally across the two
banks. A less levered bank has less of a need to fire-sale assets. Second, giving all assets to the least
levered bank is not always the solution. When the shocked asset is liquid (think of sovereign debt for
instance), it can be optimal to ring-fence it in the least levered bank, while parking stable, illiquid,
assets in the most levered entity.8 The intuition is that mixing all assets in one bank, even the least
levered, contaminates the stable asset with the volatile asset’s shock. The bank is the forced to react
to the shock by selling both categories of assets, even though the stable asset faces no shock and is
illiquid. To limit this effect, it is better to put the stable asset in the levered bank, which will then
be facing no shock.9
3.3.3. The impact of bank mergers on systemic risk
We now show how the merger of two banks can affect aggregate vulnerability. There are two effects:
a portfolio effect and a leverage effect. The portfolio effect comes from the fact that the merged bank
does not have the same portfolio as the two banks. The leverage effect comes from the fact that the
new bank has a different leverage ratio.
To see these two effects at work, start from an “unrelated” banking system and consider the
merger of the two banks which have identical size A and leverages of b1 and b2.. To determine
whether the merger is stabilizing, we compare aggregate vulnerability before and after the merger:
8To see this formally, consider the limiting case where l2 = 0, i.e., liquidations of asset 2 have no price impact. Then
AV unrelated < AV one bank iff s1 < s2.
9Note that this argument remains true even if we change the liquidation rule such that bank liquidate less high price-
impact assets, as long as they still do.
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 AV Before = 2H2 ×
(
b1l1s1+b2l2s2
2 .
)
AV After = 2H2 × bmergedl∗s∗.
where bmerged =
1
1+b1
b1+
1
1+b2
b2
1
1+b1
+ 11+b2
.
The above formula contains the two effects. The “portfolio” effect is more salient when we
assume b1 = b2 = b
merged. In this case, the merger is stabilizing iff (s1 − s2)(l1 − l2) > 0, i.e. iff
the most illiquid asset also faces the biggest shocks. As in Section 3.3.1, when this is the case, the
dissemination effect dominates the contamination effect after the merger. Because the new bank
owns both a shocked and a stable asset, it will sell less of the shocked asset, and more of the stable
asset. If the shocked asset is less liquid, the system is more stable. Hence, the portfolio effect is in
general ambiguous but can be signed.
The leverage effect always makes the merged entity more stable. To see this, assume both assets
have the same shock s1 = s2 and same liquidity l1 = l2. The leverage of the merged bank b
merged
is lower than the asset-weighted leverage: bmerged < (b1 + b2)/2 because of Jensen’s Inequality. This
effect can be surprisingly large when pre-merger leverages differs significantly. Consider the example
in Figure 1. A risky Bank had debt of 90 and equity of 10, and a safer Bank had debt of 10 and
equity of 90. The merged bank has leverage of 1, compared to the average leverage of 4.55. As a
result, the merged entity, even when both assets are identical, is less levered than the average entity.
This makes the system more stable.
4. Measuring Vulnerability of European Banks
Europe is a natural testing ground for the model because detailed holdings data per bank are available
through the European Banking Authority (EBA) as a result of the 2011 bank stress tests. Given the
role that sovereign debt has played in the European banking crises, we focus our analysis on banks’
sovereign bond holdings.
4.1. Data
Risk exposures M are taken directly from the results of the European stress tests published in July
2011 on the EBA website, which provides detailed accounts for the 90 largest banks in the EU27
countries. We focus on the following 42 asset classes: sovereign debt of each of the 27 EU countries
plus 10 others, commercial real estate, mortgages, corporate loans, retail SME and retail revolving
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credit lines. 10 Looking at overall exposure, the EBA data reveal that banks’ total exposure to
commercial real estate is 1.2 tn euros (5% of aggregate banking assets); small business lending is
744bn euros (3.2%); mortgages are 4.7 tn euros (20%); and corporate loans are 6.7 tn euros (29%).
Sovereign bonds are a modest fraction of the aggregate bank balance sheet: 2.3 tn euros, or about
13% of total banking assets.
To populate the leverage matrix B, we use the book values for total assets and equity which
are reported in the stress tests. This approach contrasts with our US analysis in the next section
where we use market leverage. Using book leverage, however, does allow us to include a number of
non-listed banks (see Appendix A for the full lists the European banks in our sample.11) For each
bank, we divide total banking assets minus common equity divided by common equity. Last, we
calculate the A matrix using total bank exposures from the EBA. For price impact, we assume price
impact of L = 10−13Id.
4.2. Model Validation on the Sovereign Crisis.
Between Dec 31, 2009 and September 16, 2011, European bank stocks (the subset of our sample
which is publicly traded) fell by an average of 54%. In this Section, we ask if this meltdown comes
from market perception of direct and indirect exposures to losses on sovereign debt from Greece,
Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS).
We first calculate the vulnerability of each european bank using equation (12). As our hypothetical
shock SGIIPS to risk factors, in our baseline specifications, we assume a 50% write-down on GIIPS
debt, with no impact on the debt prices of other sovereigns.12
We first provide in Table 1 the ranking of banks by indirect vulnerabilities (V (i)). Rankings
in terms of indirect and direct effect do not correlate very much, which suggests that they provide
different information. The Spearman rank correlation between direct and indirect exposure to GIIPS
is .14, and not significantly different from zero. Indirect vulnerability is not correlated with size
(Spearman rank correlation =-.03), and negatively correlated with leverage (with a Spearman rank
correlation of -.59, statistically significant at 1%). All in all, indirect vulnerability, which forms the
core of our analysis, is not obviously correlated with available measures. On average, the direct
impact of a full-blown GIIPS crisis would be to wipe out 1.6 times the equity for the average banks,
10http://stress-test.eba.europa.eu/
11These non listed banks are far from being negligible in size: they hold 20% of total banking assets. This is due to the
large number of mutual and savings banks, in particular in Germany and Spain.
12In alternative specifications, we have used, as shock S, a 50% write-down on Greek banks only, as well as a shock to
Greece, Ireland and Portgual. Measuring expected losses under these alternative scenario led to similar results. This is
not surprising since yields of all five GIIPS countries tend to comove.
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which represents some 380bn euros in aggregate. The indirect effect is even bigger, since it averages
3.4 times the bank’s equity (2300bn euros), even assuming that european sovereigns are as liquid as
US stocks.
We then regress cumulative returns over 2010 - Sep 2011 on our measures of exposure:
Rit = a+ bV (i) + cDirectExposureit + uit. (19)
These estimates are reported in Table 2. In these regressions, it is important to recognize that
vulnerability V (i) only captures indirect exposure, after one round of deleveraging. There is, however,
a more direct impact of the Greek write-down which comes through direct exposure. We control for
this direct effect V0(i) = e
′
iAMSGIIPS/Ei. We also control for bank size and leverage, to capture
easily available proxies of exposure, and make sure our indirect vulnerability measure indeed adds
something to available proxies of exposure.
The first three columns are simple OLS regressions. Out of 90 banks covered by the stress
tests, only 51 are publicly listed, and we have complete data for 49 observations only. To reduce
sensitivity to outliers, we therefore report median regression results in column 4-6. Both sets of
results confirm that the differences in indirect vulnerabilities explain part of the cross-section of bank
returns during the crisis. In OLS results, the R2 of indirect vulnerability alone is 8%, against 13%
when direct exposure is also included. Size and leverage do not have any independent explanatory
power. The direct and indirect vulnerabilities have the same economic impact on stock returns. If
indirect vulnerability increases by 4 times bank equity (sample standard deviation for both direct
and indirect measures), cumulative return drop by 4 percentage points.
4.3. Systemicness Ranking.
In this Section, we briefly discuss the properties of our “systemicness” measure on European Data.
Table 8 reports the systemicness ranking for the 20 most systemic banks in Europe, along with size
and leverage. The shock we consider is a 50% write-off on of GIIPS sovereign debt. Given equation
(11), we know that S(i) can be interpreted as the impact of the shock on aggregate banking equity,
coming from the liquidations of some assets by bank i.
Our model has the natural feature that large and levered banks should mechanically be systemic.
Indeed, banks, when facing a shock to their assets, sell a fraction of their assets equal to the debt-to-
equity ratio. So the larger the bank, the more euros of assets it will sell, which will trigger a larger
price impact and therefore a stronger impact on other banks’ balance sheets. The more levered it
is, the more assets it will need to sell, given size. Table 3 confirms the intuition that systemicness
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and size are strongly correlated, but size is not the entire story. Overall, the correlation coefficient
between size and systemicness is .47. For the 20 most systemic banks, systemicness ranking differs
somewhat from size. For instance, Intesa SanPaolo appears more systemic than BNP Paribas even
though BNP is nearly three times as large, and both have the same leverage. In the cross-section,
however, leverage is statistically uncorrelated with systemicness.
4.4. Policy experiments
In this Section, we use our model to evaluate a number of different policies which have the potential
to reduce systemic risk. The results of these experiments are reported in Table 4. For each policy
“experiment”, we calculate the aggregate vulnerability to three different types of shocks. The first is
a 50% write-down on Greek sovereign debt. The second is a 50% write-down on the debt of Greece,
Ireland, and Portugal. The third is a 50% write-down on all GIIPS debt.
The first line of Table 4 corresponds to the baseline estimates of aggregate vulnerability under no
intervention. In this case, a 50% write-down on Greek debt alone would lead to a 27% reduction in
aggregate equity. A 50% reduction in all GIIPS debt leads to a reduction by 285% of aggregate bank
equity. Note that these are the indirect effets of the write-downs, coming from the price-impact of
liquidations.
4.4.1. Size cap
The first policy we consider is a size cap. Assume a bank i holds aimi,k euros of asset k. If assets
ai > c, where c is the cap, we set the bank’s assets to c, and redistribute residual asset holdings
(ai− c)mi,k equally among non-capped banks. This procedure does not affect the portfolio structure
of the capped banks, but does affect the portfolios of the other banks. Since after one iteration some
previously uncapped banks end up above the cap (this happens in particular when the cap is low),
we iterate this process until all banks are below or at the cap.
We report the results of this experiment for caps at 500, 900 and 1300 bn euros in the first three
rows of Table 4. The various columns of the table correspond to different types of shock. For example,
results in the first column always concern a writedown to Greek debt only.
The table shows that capping at 500bn requires to cap 17 banks, while only 2 banks are above
the 1300bn cap. The main lesson from this “experiment” is that the overall impact of size caps on
aggregate vulnerability is small, and sometimes even negative. Capping size does not have the power
of reducing systemic risk as we measure it. In this experiment, the leverage of each bank is kept
constant.
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4.4.2. Leverage cap
We next study the impact of capping leverage. Here, the policy is much simpler: if x is the cap,
then, for all banks with leverage above x, we set D/E = x. We implicitly assume these banks can
costlessly raise equity to reach the maximum leverage. This assumption is a bit unrealistic, but it
allows us to investigate quantitatively the effect of leverage on vulnerability.
We try three different caps (knowing we capped leverage to 30 in the data): 15, 20 and 25. We
calculate the amount of equity capped banks need to raise to reach this cap: for instance capping
leverage at 15 (25th percentile) requires banks to raise a staggering 480bn euros. This experiment
shows that, to obtain a significant reduction in systemic risk, the regulator would need to set a very
drastic cap. For instance, capping leverage to 25 (63rd percentile) only reduces vulnerability to a
GIIPS shock from 285 to 270% of aggregate equity. A blind leverage cap does not achieve much
either.
4.4.3. Merging the riskiest banks together
Perhaps more targeted policies can make the most systemic banks safer? Suppose the regulator
merges the most exposed banks into a single one. For each bank, we define as “exposure” the
fraction of bank equity that would be lost directly in a 50% write-down of GIP debt. We then study
three scenarios: merge all banks whose exposure is above 50%, above 100% and above 150% of their
own equity. This means merging respectively 14, 8 and 4 banks. table 4 shows that the effect is nearly
zero. The intuition is that, vis a vis the shocks considered, these banks have “similar” portfolios.
They will sell the same total amounts of assets, whether merged or separate: the overall price impact
will be the same. In our model, merging two banks with identical portfolio structure into a single
bank (with the same structure) has no impact on aggregate vulnerability is these banks have the
same leverage. This is what happens here: ring fencing does not reduce systemic risk.
4.4.4. Merge exposed banks with unexposed ones
As an alternative to ring-fencing, we therefore look at the impact of merging the 8 most exposed banks
with the banks that are unexposed to the GIP write-down (16 of our 90 banks have this feature). To
isolate the impact of merging the two groups, we first merge the exposed banks (and report the impact
on AV), then merge the unexposed banks, and then perform the full merger. Merging unexposed
banks does not change AV at all, because of the effect discussed in the previous experiment: they
are identical with respect to the shock. Merging exposed banks does not change things much either,
also as discussed previously. Merging the two groups into one bank does, however, increase systemic
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risk (not very much, but consistently so). The intuition is that the assets of unexposed banks, who
were previously not sold in response to the shock, are now contaminated by the poor performance
if GIP debt: they are now sold which reduces their returns and has a stronger impact on all banks.
This policy experiment illustrates this channel of transmission.
4.4.5. Dismantling exposed banks
As an alternative to the proposal considered above, we might ask what would happen if we dismantled
the banks most exposed to a 50% write-down on GIP debt. We reshuffle their assets equally among
the remaining banks. We start by focusing our attention on the 17 banks for which this shock is
larger than 100% of their equity. If we do this, Table 4 shows that aggregate vulnerability increases
slightly. By reshuffling GIP sovereigns into previously unexposed banks, we induce these banks to sell
assets. The reason is that GIP sovereign exposures contaminate previously healthy balance sheets.
4.4.6. Optimizing capital injection
The above experiments suggest that very little can be gained from capping leverage, and that all
other policies have ambiguous, or even adverse, impacts on systemic risk. In this last exercise, we
explore the power of an optimal targeted policy. Recall that aggregate vulnerability to a shock vector
S can be written as:
AVt =
∑
i
bi ×
(
ai,t−1
E
× (eiMS)× 1′At−1MLM ′ei) (20)
so that AV is a weighted average of debt to equity ratios bi’s. Weights measure the extent to which
leverage of i is really bad for aggregate vulnerability. This is the case when (1) the bank is large (it
will sell a lot of assets), (2) the bank is exposed to the shock we consider (its asset returns will be
low) and (3) linkages are strong.
We assume the regulator has a given amount of cash F to invest in bank equity. Equity injection
into bank i is given by the vector f = (f1, ..., fn), so that 1
′f = F . When a bank receives fi euros of
fresh equity, we assume the entire amount is used to repay existing debt, so that its debt to equity
ratio becomes (Di − fi)/(Ei + fi).
We minimize Eq. (20) subject to the constraints that 1′f = F and bi = (Di − fi)/(Ei + fi). We
also impose the third constraint that the regulator cannot withdraw cash from equity-rich banks (see
below), so that fi > 0, for all i.
The first lesson of this exercise is that optimizing equity injection across banks allows us to reduce
aggregate vulnerability a lot more than any of the policy experiments we considered in Table 4. We
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can see this visually in Figure 2, where we report the optimal AV obtained for various levels of
aggregate investment F. Panel A shows the aggregate vulnerability to a GIP shock, while Panel B
shows aggregate vulnerability to a GIIPS shock (both assuming a 50% write-down). Data from panel
A shows a reduction by a third in systemic risk: AV goes down from 47% to 31% using only 50 bn
euros of equity.
Then, the impact of additional injections decreases: 200 bn leads to an AV of 23%and 500 bn
to 18%. The effect on aggregate vulnerability to GIIPS is smaller in relative terms, and decreases
more slowly, as more banks are exposed to GIIPS debt than to GIP debt. 50 bn euros only buy
a reduction from 285% to 240% of aggregate equity. Still, the effect is large compared to previous
policies considered in this paper. The size of AV reduction is comparable to capping debt to equity
at 20 for all banks, which would require banks to raise some 170 bn euros of equity. Optimizing
capital injections therefore reduces the cost of stabilizing the system.
Table 5 then reports cross-sectional optimal equity injections. Here, we assume the regulator
invests 200 bn euros, and seeks to minimize aggregate vulnerability to a 50% write-down on GIIPS
debt. Table 10 only reports the 20 largest banks by equity issue. This list consists mostly of Italian,
Spanish and Greek banks. These banks are not the largest, but the most exposed to the write-down.
By construction, optimal injection has a very strong correlation with systemicness (.91). Correlation
with the four components of systemicness is lower: .16 (leverage), .16 (Size), 38 (direct exposure),
.21 (linkage). This shows that when deciding to inject fresh capital into banks, the regulator should
consider all components of systemicness to minimize taxpayer’s investment.
4.5. Robustness of results to an alternative liquidation rule
While our model delivers a number of useful intuitions, it relies on a few simplifying assumptions.
In this section, we relax one of these: the fact that all assets have the same price impact ratio (the
L matrix has identical diagonal elements). If some assets are less liquid than others, then it is not
optimal for banks to sell assets in proportion of their holdings as we have thus far assumed. In this
case, banks will first sell their most liquid securities. We do not relax this assumption in the general
case here, but focus on a polar case to simplify exposition.
We posit that all non sovereign assets are infinitely illiquid, so that banks have to concentrate
liquidation on sovereigns alone. In this case, the formula for Aggregate Vulnerability to a shock S is
modified:
AV =
1′At−1MLM∗
′
BAt−1MS
Et−1
, (21)
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where M∗ is a weight matrix that accounts for the fact that non-sovereigns are not liquidated. Each
element is given by: m∗ik = mik/
(∑
kmik
)
. We only focus on factors k which corresponds to sovereign
holdings. Hence, elements of M∗ are bigger: banks will liquidate more sovereigns in response to an
adverse shock to their balance sheets.
The striking feature of these simulations is that aggregate vulnerability is much lower under this
alternative liquidation rule. The aggregate vulnerability of banks to a Greek write-down goes from
25% of aggregate equity (core specification) to just 1.4%. AV to a GIP writedown goes from 47% to
2.6%; and AV to a GIIPS write-down is now 23%, instead of 285%. Changing the liquidation rule
has two opposite effects. One the one hand, banks liquidate much more sovereign bonds, which has a
stronger price impact on other banks. But on the other, they don’t liquidate the other assets, which
are the majority of assets held in balance sheets.
To understand this further we report, in Table 6, values of AV for alternative liquidation rules.
We progressively add other asset classes to the list of liquid assets. As can be seen from Table 6, as
long as the list of liquid assets is small enough (i.e. corresponds to less than 41% of banks’ assets),
aggregate vulnerability is reduced by illiquidity of the other assets. The intuition is that illiquidity
prevents banks from transmitting their shocks to otherwise immune banks. When, however, sellable
assets take up a larger fraction of the balance sheet (in our simulations, this happens as soon as we
include corporate loans), then the fire sale concentration effect starts dominating the “ring fencing”
effect: because banks cannot liquidate everything, they have to liquidate more liquid assets, which
increases the price impact and therefore contagion. Table 6 illustrate the ambiguity of alternative
liquidation rules on AV .
5. Measuring Vulnerability of US Banks
In this section we use the model to measure the vulnerability of US banks between 2001 and 2010.
We start by describing the sample and how we estimate the factor exposures. We then validate the
model by looking at the build-up of systemic risk during the 2007 pre-crisis period. We also analyze
the predicted effect of the Lehman Brothers failure on other banks. After these checks, we present
three sets of outputs, including (a) the most vulnerable banks at various points in time, (b) the most
systemic banks in terms of their contribution to potential deleveraging, and (c) an analysis of the
impact of the WaMu and JP Morgan merger on systemic risk.
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5.1. Sample Description and Data
We select the largest US-listed 100 financial firms by market capitalization in 2006 on the CRSP
database. Financial firms have SIC codes between 6000 and 7000. The complete list is shown in
the Appendix, and includes commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and money
managers. Citigroup and Bank of America are the largest firms in December 2006, but investment
banks form the next group of large firms. For this sample, we collect weekly and monthly stock
returns from January 2001 through March 2011. Because firms list, delist, and merge through the
2001-2011 period, the average number of firms with complete data at any point in time is 88. Finally,
we merge financial firm stock returns data from year t with annual balance sheet data at the end of
year t− 1 from COMPUSTAT.
To compute the systemic risk measures, we need estimates of M , L, B, and A, which we obtain
as follows.
Asset Matrix At−1: We compute market value of the firm’s assets (i.e., enterprise value) on a
weekly basis by adding book assets (Compustat item AT) and the market value of equity from CRSP,
and subtracting book common equity (Compustat item CEQ). Because the accounting data refresh
annually, this means that our estimates of enterprise value are increasingly stale as we approach the
end of each calendar year. For fast growing firms, this introduces some lumpiness in our measures.
We define debt as the difference between book assets and book equity and compute market leverage
di/ei by taking the ratio of debt to market equity.
Target Leverage Matrix B: We assume that target leverage is the same as lagged leverage.
Equivalently, we assume that firms adjust their capital structures quickly in response to shocks.
This assumption may be too extreme during deleveraging scenarios, particularly for the most levered
firms. For example, consider how a bank with D/E = 19 might behave following a 2 percent drop in
the value of its portfolio. Realized leverage increases to 31.7 (=19/(1-2%x20)). To return to target
leverage of 19, the bank would have to sell 41% of the remaining assets in the portfolio. In practice,
the bank may do this slowly, remaining over-levered in the short-run, and perhaps raising equity or
lowering dividends.. In order to maintain realism and prevent our measures from blowing up, we cap
target leverage at 20.
Liquidity Matrix L: This diagonal matrix measures for each asset, the price impact in per-
centage terms of a one dollar liquidation. For non-financial equities, one can estimate this number
following previous research on price impact in equity markets. For each stock, we compute individual
Amihud (2002) price impact ratios based on the first 90 trading days of 2002, and then aggregate
these to yield a a market-wide price impact of 6.24x10−13. This means that to depress the market by
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one percent would require order flow of $16 billion, approximately 10% of weekly trading volume.13
The most challenging part of this exercise is determining how to compute liquidity ratios for
factors other than equity. We suspect, for example, that a bank selling a specialized loan portfolio
might incur a larger fire sale discount than a bank selling a portfolio of liquid S&P 500 stocks. But,
absent other data on price impact, we take a conservative approach and assign these factors the same
price impact parameter as that of equities. This has the effect of making L matrix proportional to the
identity matrix. While we view this simplification as unfortunate, we believe it to be conservative,
and also somewhat unavoidable.
Factor Selection and the Portfolio Matrix M : The portfolio matrix M contains, for each
bank i the weights mik of each asset k in the portfolio. Here we do not observe banks’ portfolios
directly, so we estimate M with a factor model. For each bank i, we run the following regression on
a rolling basis:
Ri,t =
∑
k
mi,kFk,t + it. (22)
Each week, we run this regression over the past 104 weeks, thereby obtaining rolling estimates of M .
Provided we have the full vector of asset returns Fk,t, the estimated mi,k is equal to the weight of
each asset in the bank’s portfolio. To be able make this inference, Ri,t has to be obtained through
unlevering the equity returns according to Rit = (A/D)R
equity
it . Implicitly, we assume that: (1) we
have the adequate set of factor returns to represent each bank’s portfolio, (2) that holdings are fairly
stable (i.e. did not move too much over the past 2 years), and (3) that the stock market has some
understanding of each bank’s exposure to each asset.
In selecting factors, we adopt the following principles. First, we were careful to select a series
of factors which were not too collinear (for example, it would be challenging to estimate a bank’s
separate exposure to AA and A bonds from a stock return regression). Second, it is important to
select factors which proxy for the returns of the underlying assets held by each institution.14 Third,
we sought a sufficiently large list of factors so as to be able to capture diversity in the holding of
the different banks. These considerations in mind, the factors we use are based on the returns of
(1) non-financial firms in the S&P 500; (2) mortgage REITs; (3) 10-year nominal US Treasuries;
(4) Commodities, proxied using the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index; and (5) High Yield Bonds
13We compute the implied price impact of the complete stock market by aggregating the individual ratios according to∑
i w
2
iAmihud
2
i where wi is the weight of equity of stock i in the aggregate stock market.
14This led us to exclude, on principle, factors which were associated with bank equity returns but were unlikely related
to the underlying assets held by the bank. For example, changes in the TED spread are significantly correlated with bank
equity returns during the financial crisis, but are more likely related to the cost associated with the bank’s liabilities rather
than its assets.
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based on the Morgan Stanley High Yield Bond Index.15 Table 1 summarizes the five factors, both
during the full sample and during the March 2007-June 2011 crisis subperiod. To reduce the impact
of measurement error, we zero out elements of the M matrix for which the estimated coefficient has
a t-statistic less than 1.5.
Since much of the cross-sectional variation between banks’ contributions to systemic risk comes
from their different risk exposures, we have verified that there is enough interesting variation across
firms. A simple way to see this is to compute time-series average exposures for each of the banks,
and then compare banks. State Street bank, for example, has sample average factor exposures of
(0.12, 0.03, 0.02, 0.00, and 0.02) while Mellon Bank has exposures of (0.25, 0.01, 0.16, 0.00, and
0.14) The nature of the exposures differs across banks, with State Street having greater exposure to
non-financial firm equity and Mellon Bank having higher exposure to mortgage REITs.
5.2. Validating the Model
We start by performing a series of simple exercises to validate the empirical relevance of the model.
We start by showing time-series measures of aggregate vulnerability AV , as well as the contributions
(the systemicness S(i)) of a few important firms such as Lehman Brothers and Citigroup. We show
that bank-specific vulnerabilities are useful for predicting the maximum drawdown of these firms
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. We then show that the model is quite useful for predicting how
individual bank stocks respond to the failure of Lehman Brothers.
5.2.1. Time series measures of aggregate vulnerability AV
Figure 3 shows aggregate vulnerability AV, which recall is the total (i.e., systemwide) dollar price
impact of deleveraging resulting from a one standard deviation shock to each of the five factors,
calculated according to equation (7). The series starts low in early 2001, drops in mid 2005, and
then rises quickly in 2007.
We remind the reader that while the magnitude of these results depends on the scaling matrix L,
the time-series behavior is unlikely much affected. To the extent that we believe price impact went up
during the crisis; or that price impact varies significantly across asset classes, the dollar magnitude
is impacted.
15Because these factors were chosen with hindsight bias, we perform a robustness test in which the factors are estimated
directly from principle components of bank stock returns. The main drawback is that statistical factors are harder to
interpret economically: factors are not “assets” so the elements of the M matrix cannot be interpreted as portfolio
weights. This is why we rely primarily on the economic factors for most of our analysis, but show in the appendix that
using the statistical factors estimated through PCA over 2001-2006 produces similar insights.
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Equation (11) tells us how to compute the extent to which shocks to a given bank can affect the
entire system. Figure 4 plots time-series of contributions to vulnerability, ie., the systemicness S(i)
of six important banks in our sample: Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup,
Lehman Brothers, and Goldman Sachs. The figure shows that many of these individual bank series
share the common characteristic of systemicness S(i) rising through the crisis to a peak in January
2009, subsequently falling as equity markets rebound and factor volatility drops.
Figure 5 shows that systemicness is related to size and leverage in the cross-section, but that
each of these variables explains less than 60 percent of the variation: differential exposures in the M
matrix explain the rest.
To be clear, a bank’s contribution to total systemic risk S(i) is not the same as its vulnerability
to common shocks. For example, a small levered bank may by highly susceptible to common shocks,
while not imposing much in the way of spillovers. Notwithstanding, the two are correlated in the
data.
5.2.2. Bank Sensitivity to Deleveraging: Lehman bankruptcy
Eq. (15) shows how to compute the impact of a shock to the assets of bank i on any other bank j. In
this section, we study the impact of the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. Before
markets opened that day, Lehman Brothers announced that it would file for bankruptcy protection,
citing debt of $768 billion and assets with a market value of $639 million. Although the company
filed for reorganization under the US bankruptcy code, market participants could have reasonably
expected substantial liquidations of its asset portfolio.
Taking the liquidation rule of our model literally, we would expect banks with high exposures to
the same assets would experience reductions in their portfolio value as a fraction of equity described by
equation (15). Since pre-failure, Lehman had market leverage of approximately 20-to-1, a -5% shock
to its assets would result in complete liquidation of its portfolio. We thus multiply the expression
in equation (15) by 0.05. To normalize the equation, we take equity value on the Friday before the
announcement.
We then compare this predicted equity shock to the actual return. This is shown graphically in
Figure 6. As can be seen, there is a discernible positive correlation between the predicted return and
the actual stock return on Monday September 15, 2008. 16
We would expect the relationship between vulnerability V (i) and realized returns in Figure 6 to
be quite noisy, as the Lehman failure was also a significant information event, both on the magnitude
16We analyze returns over a short window because of significant financial news the next day: on September 16, 2008,
the Federal Reserve Board authorized lending of up to $85 billion to insurance company AIG.
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of losses faced by the banking sector, and on the willingness of the government to intervene to
stem those losses. Table 8 shows the results of cross-sectional regressions of realized stock returns
on September 15, 2008 on vulnerability to Lehman deleveraging. One possible concern with our
vulnerability measure is that it does not add much information to size and leverage, since large
banks, or levered banks are the most adversely affected the Lehman bankruptcy. We include bank
leverage and bank size as controls in our regressions of Table 8.
5.2.3. Bank vulnerability and market performance during the crisis
Although our firm-specific vulnerability measures V (i) are not forecasters of stock returns per se, they
might be useful for for explaining the cross-section of returns following a systemwide deleveraging
shock. To operationalize this, here we study the relationship between the maximum drawdown in
stock returns experienced by each firm during the crisis, and V (i). Maximum drawdown is the
minimum cumulative rolling return from July 2007 through March 2011 (i.e., the cumulative return
corresponding to the lowest price experienced during that period).
Figure 7 plots this relationship, revealing a negative correlation of -28%. The corresponding
regression, also shown in the figure, yields a t-statistics of -3.88 on bank vulnerability. Interestingly,
this result is not driven by leverage alone. In a multivariate regression of drawdowns on vulnerability
and bank leverage, vulnerability retains a similar coefficient and a t-statistic of -3.12.
5.3. Outputs
5.3.1. Bank Contributions to Systemic Risk
The most systemic banks are large levered financial institutions which tend to have similar sets of
exposures. Table 9 lists the top 10 systemic banks in January 2007, January 2008, and January 2009.
In the table we show the “systemicness” S(i). In a separate column, we show S(i) scaled by AV .
This rescaled numbers tells us how important a given bank is in relative contribution to aggregate
vulnerability. Of course, a bank may have a relatively large contribution to AV when the level of
AV is low, in which case the scaling is less meaningful.
As can be seen, this exercise turns up the usual crowd of large levered financial institutions. In
January 2007, AIG, JP Morgan, and Morgan Stanley are at the top of the list; by January 2009, the
dollar impact of their deleveraging is much greater (JP Morgan rises from $1.4 billion to $16 billion),
and the rankings change somewhat, with Wells Fargo, JP Morgan, and Bank of American topping
the list.
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A possible concern is that the rankings in Table 9 do not capture much more than the product
of size and leverage. To be sure, size and leverage are important inputs in equation (11). However,
we find only a 0.7 correlation between S(i) and the product of size and leverage in January 2009,
and lower correlations still for the other two panels. We provide graphical evidence of such imperfect
correlation in Figure 8, where we plot systemicness against leverage or bank size. While indeed
systemicness appears correlated with both size and leverage, they are far from explaining the full
cross section of our measure. For instance, BofA is the biggest bank but scores low on systemicness.
5.3.2. Bank Vulnerability to Deleveraging
Bank vulnerability is the impact of a shock to all factors on each single bank. As in equation (12),
we can express this in dollar terms or normalize it as a percentage of bank’s equity. Panel A of
Table 10 shows dollar vulnerability in January 2007, January 2008, and January 2009. We show the
top 10 most vulnerable banks, meaning the ten banks which would suffer the largest reduction in net
worth if there were a simultaneous shock to each of the factors. According to this measure, AIG,
JP Morgan, and Citigroup are the most vulnerable banks in early 2007; the rankings do not change
much over time: by 2009, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan and Citigroup are the most vulnerable.
Panel B of Table 10 shows vulnerability for the same set of dates, except now we scale by each
firm’s equity value. Although AIG still appears among the top banks according to this scaling,
the list otherwise looks quite different. For example, Radian Group, a highly levered bond insurer,
shows up as the most vulnerable institution in both 2007 and early 2008. Although it is difficult to
generalize as to which firm characteristics land them on this list, cursory inspection reveals a number
of insurance companies specialized in insuring mortgage-related securities.
5.3.3. Analysis of the JP Morgan acquisition of Washington Mutual.
On September 25, 2008, JP Morgan Chase acquired the assets of Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu).
Did this make the bank system more or less fragile? The merged bank may be safer than the sum of
the individual contributions, if there are large differences in bank leverage, or if the banks have quite
different sets of factor exposures. We can run this thought experiment using our model to generate
a counterfactual.
In Table 11, Panel A, we calculate: the systemicness S(i) for WaMu, of JP Morgan, for the
hypothetical merged bank. The merged bank inherits the assets of both banks and takes on the
asset-weighted capital structure of the original banks (i.e., it inherits total debt and total equity from
the individual banks). Just prior to the merger, the market value of JP Morgan assets was $194
27
billion, while that of Washington Mutual was $314 billion. On a market value basis, Washington
Mutual had leverage of 42.6, while JP Morgan had leverage of 12.75. Following our earlier convention,
we assume that target leverage for Washington Mutual was 20, and use this number to form a blended
leverage for the two banks of 16.5, and total assets of $508 billion.
Taking each bank separately and computing equation (7), WaMu contributed $7,761 to aggregate
vulnerability AV, making it one of the most systemic banks in the sample on this date. JPM
contributed $2,061 to deleveraging. When we combine the banks, we see that the hypothetical
merged bank is slightly safer than the two banks individually, because $9,060<$2,061+$7,761.
We next compute hypothetical bank mergers of WaMu with each of the remaining US financial
institutions in our sample. Table 11, Panel B lists the ten safest acquirors from the perspective of
systemic risk; a merger with each of these banks would reduce systemic risk relative to the banks
operating standalone. Panel C lists the ten riskiest acquirors; a merger with each of these banks
would increase systemic risk relative to the banks remaining standalone.
6. Conclusions
During the financial crisis of 2007-2009, regulators in the United States and Europe have been
frustrated at the difficulty of understanding the complete set of risk exposures of the largest and
most levered financial institutions. Yet, at the time, it was unclear how such data might have been
used to make the financial system safer. Our paper is an attempt to show show how such information
can be used in an analytically coherent way.
The key assumption in our model is that banks use asset liquidations to return to target leverage.
We use this assumption to predict how individual banks will behave following shocks to their net
worth, and how the resulting fire sales may spillover to other banks.
While the model is quite stylized, it generates a number of useful insights concerning the distribu-
tion of risks in the financial sector. For example, the model suggests that regulators should pay close
attention to risks which are concentrated in the most levered banks. The model also suggests that
policies which explicitly target bank solvency may be suboptimal from the perspective of controlling
contagion.
We then apply the model to the largest financial institutions in the United States and Europe, and
use it to evaluate a number of policy proposals to reduce systemic risk. When analyzing the European
banks in 2011, we show how a policy of targeted equity injections, if distributed appropriately across
the most systemic banks, can significantly reduce systemic risk.
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Appendix A. European Banks Involved in the 2011 stress tests. The sample includes the banks included in the EBA 
stress tests and thus considered in our European analysis. 
Publicly listed banks  Non-public banks  
Irish Lf.& Perm.Ghg.  Banque Et Caisse D'epargne De L'etat  
Bank Of Cyprus  Bayerische Landesbank  
Marfin Popular Bank  Bpce  
Otp Bank  Caixa D'estalvis De Catalunya,  
Swedbank 'A'  Caixa D'estalvis Unio De Caixes De  
Banco De Sabadell  Caixa De Aforros De Galicia, Vigo,  
Dnb Nor  Caixa Geral De Depîsitos, Sa  
Efg Eurobank Ergasias  Caja De Ahorros Y M.P. De Gipuzkoa Y  
Bank Of Piraeus  Caja De Ahorros Y M.P. De Zaragoza,  
Bnp Paribas  Caja De Ahorros Y Pensiones De  
Abn Amro Holding   Caja Espa„A De Inversiones, Salamanca  
Ing Groep  Dekabank Deutsche Girozentrale,  
Nordea Bank  Dz Bank Ag Dt. Zentral-  
Banca Monte Dei Paschi  Effibank  
Banco Popolare  Grupo Bbk  
Banco Santander  Grupo Bmn  
Banco Bpi  Grupo Caja3  
Alpha Bank  Hsh Nordbank Ag, Hamburg  
Societe Generale  Landesbank Baden  
Banco Pastor  Monte De Piedad Y Caja De Ahorros  
Banco Comr.Portugues 'R'  Norddeutsche Landesbank  
Bankinter 'R'  Nova Ljubljanska Banka  
Bbv.Argentaria  Nykredit  
Espirito Santo Financial  Oesterreichische Volksbank Ag  
Dexia  Powszechna Kasa Oszcz_Dno_Ci Bank  
Erste Group Bank  Rabobank Nederland  
Lloyds Banking Group  Raiffeisen Bank International   
Barclays  Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Ab   
Royal Bank Of Sctl.Gp.  Westlb Ag, Dusseldorf  
Commerzbank  Wgz Bank Ag Westdt. Geno. Zentralbk,  
Allied Irish Banks   
Deutsche Bank   
Bank Of Ireland   
National Bk.Of Greece   
Kbc Group   
Hsbc Holdings   
Unicredit   
Intesa Sanpaolo   
Banco Popular Espanol   
Danske Bank   
Svenska Handbkn.'A'   
Landesbank Bl.Hldg.   
Agri.Bank Of Greece   
Credit Agricole   
Ubi Banca   
Hypo Real Estate Hldg   
Sns Reaal   
Tt Hellenic Postbank    
Caja De Ahorros Del Mediterraneo    
Bankia    
Banca Civica    
 
Appendix B. US Financial firms in sample. The sample includes the largest 100 financial firms by market 
capitalization in December 2006. 
Name MV Equity Name MV 
Citigroup Inc $273,691 C I G N A Corp $13,495 
Bank Of America Corp    239,758  Northern Trust Corp   13,273  
American International Group Inc    186,296  Ameriprise Financial Inc   13,187  
Jpmorgan Chase & Co    167,551  Marshall & Ilsley Corp New   12,590  
Wells Fargo & Co New    120,049  Legg Mason Inc   12,491  
Wachovia Corp 2Nd New    114,542  Sovereign Bancorp Inc   12,007  
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co      85,410  T Rowe Price Group Inc   11,597  
Goldman Sachs Group Inc      84,890  C I T Group Inc New   11,059  
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc      82,050  Aon Corp   10,944  
American Express Co      73,094  C N A Financial Corp   10,924  
U S Bancorp Del      63,617  Nymex Holdings Inc   10,788  
Federal National Mortgage Assn      57,908  Synovus Financial Corp   10,019  
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp      47,035  M B I A Inc    9,849  
Berkshire Hathaway Inc Del      45,920  T D Ameritrade Holding Corp    9,709  
Metlife Inc      44,861  E Trade Financial Corp    9,558  
Washington Mutual Inc      42,725  Ambac Financial Group Inc    9,450  
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc      41,408  Comerica Inc    9,322  
Prudential Financial Inc      40,955  Zions Bancorp    8,798  
Allstate Corp      40,690  Unionbancal Corp    8,597  
Travelers Companies Inc      37,047  C B O T Holdings Inc    8,004  
Capital One Financial Corp      31,397  Coventry Health Care Inc    7,976  
Suntrust Banks Inc      29,907  Cincinnati Financial Corp    7,839  
Bank Of New York Mellon Corp      29,601  Compass Bancshares Inc    7,837  
Hartford Financial Svcs Grp Inc      29,573  Hudson City Bancorp Inc    7,742  
Franklin Resources Inc      27,932  C B Richard Ellis Group Inc    7,481  
Countrywide Financial Corp      26,365  T D Banknorth Inc    7,374  
Schwab Charles Corp New      24,469  Safeco Corp    7,222  
B B & T Corp      23,763  Unum Group    7,118  
National City Corp      23,092  American Capital Ltd    6,828  
Fifth Third Bancorp      22,767  Assurant Inc    6,818  
A F L A C Inc      22,747  Commerce Bancorp Inc Nj    6,614  
Aetna Inc New      22,540  Berkley W R Corp    6,613  
State Street Corp      22,395  Peoples United Financial Inc    6,345  
Chubb Corp      21,780  Torchmark Corp    6,253  
P N C Financial Services Grp Inc      21,754  Intercontinentalexchange Inc    6,198  
S L M Corp      19,935  Mercantile Bankshares Corp    5,872  
Bear Stearns Companies Inc      19,112  Health Net Inc    5,672  
Lincoln National Corp In      18,418  Huntington Bancshares Inc    5,593  
Progressive Corp Oh      18,221  Old Republic International Corp    5,366  
Regions Financial Corp New      17,996  Fidelity National Finl Inc New    5,223  
C M E Group Inc      17,746  First Horizon National Corp    5,200  
Blackrock Inc      17,686  M G I C Investment Corp Wis    5,192  
Mellon Financial Corp      17,504  First Marblehead Corp    5,159  
Western Union Co      17,184  Popular Inc    5,003  
Marsh & Mclennan Cos Inc      16,897  Edwards A G Inc    4,777  
Principal Financial Group Inc      15,835  New York Community Bancorp Inc    4,752  
Genworth Financial Inc      15,470  Markel Corp    4,639  
Keycorp New      15,272  Associated Banc Corp    4,495  
N Y S E Euronext      15,186  Radian Group Inc    4,344  
M & T Bank Corp      13,519  Janus Cap Group Inc    4,279  
 
Figure 1. Bank mergers and aggregate vulnerability. This figure shows what happens when two banks 
with different leverage marge. The merged bank has less than or equal leverage to the asset-weighted 
leverage of the two merging banks. 
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Figure 2. Optimal Aggregate Vulnerability, as a Function of Aggregate Equity Injected (in bn euros). 
This figure reports the optimal AV to a 50% write-off on GIP debt  (Panel A), GIIPS debt (Panel B). 
Such optimal AV is obtained assuming the social planner can freely allocate 200bn euros of equity into 
banks, keeping their sizes constant, so the equity injection serves to reduce debt. In Panel A, for 0bn, we 
obtain AV of 0.47. This means that, absent a capital injection, a 50% write-off on GIP debt would reduce 
aggregate bank equity by 47%. 
Panel A: Aggregate vulnerability to a 50% write-off to GIP debt (per euro of aggregate equity) 
 
Panel B: Aggregate vulnerability to a 50% write-off to GIIPS debt (per euro of aggregate equity) 
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Figure 3. Aggregate vulnerability, United States financial institutions. Aggregate vulnerability AV is 
defined according to Eq. (6) in the text. The sample includes the top-100 US financial firms listed on 
CRSP in 2006. 
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Figure 4. Contributions to time series vulnerability from various financial institutions. Vulnerability of bank i, V(i), is expressed as a percentage of the bank’s total 
equity value of all financial institutions, as in Equation (11) in text. The figure shows a few of the most important banks. 
 
0.000%
0.500%
1.000%
1.500%
2.000%
2.500% Wells Fargo 
0.000%
0.500%
1.000%
1.500%
2.000% Jpmorgan Chase & Co
0.000%
0.200%
0.400%
0.600%
0.800%
1.000%
1.200%
1.400% Bank Of America Corp
0.000%
0.200%
0.400%
0.600%
0.800%
1.000%
1.200%
1.400% Citigroup Inc
0.000%
0.020%
0.040%
0.060%
0.080%
0.100%
0.120% Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc
0.000%
0.100%
0.200%
0.300%
0.400%
0.500%
0.600% Goldman Sachs Group Inc
Figure 5. What drives individual banks’ systemicness? We plot systemicness S(i) (in January 2008) 
against leverage (Panel A), and against Size (Panel B). 
Panel A. Leverage vs. Systemicness 
 
Panel B. Size vs. Systemicness 
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Figure 6. Bank Stocks vulnerability to Lehman Brothers collapse. Vulnerability V(i,Lehman) is the dollar 
price impact of predicted deleveraging driven by an expected liquidation of Lehman Brothers holdings on 
September 15, 2008.  
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Figure 7. Vulnerability and Maximum Crisis Drawdown. We plot the maximum drawdown during the 
crisis against the ranking of the bank’s vulnerability in January 2008. Maximum drawdown is the 
minimum cumulative rolling return from July 2007 through March 2011. We also show the corresponding 
regression, above the picture. 
Maximum Drawdown(i) = -0.65 — 2.88 Vulnerability(i) [t=-3.68] 
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Figure 8. Vulnerability and Direct Exposure. Vulnerability V(i) is a bank’s exposure to deleveraging 
following an initial shock S. Direct Exposure (called “Round-0 exposure on the picture) is the simple 
levered exposure to the initial shock. The plot is drawn based on data as of January 2008. 
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Table 1. Vulnerability Ranking to a 50% write-off on all GIIPS Debt (Listed banks). We compute the 
vulnerability of the major European banks to a 50% write-down on all sovereign debt of Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. The vulnerability has two parts. The first is the direct exposure of each 
bank to the loss. The second part is the exposure of each bank to liquidations from exposed banks. The 
table also shows the size of each bank as well as its target leverage. Target leverage is actual leverage or 
30, whichever is smaller. 
Bank_Name 
Vulnerability 
V(i)  
(%) Rank
Direct 
Exposure 
(%) Rank Size Rank 
Target 
leverage Rank
Allied Irish Banks Plc -41.30 1 -11.86 2 0.01 27 30 1
Agricultural Bank Of Greece S.A.  -15.50 2 -33.55 1 0.00 48 30 1
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena -5.94 3 -3.75 3 0.01 23 30 1
Sns Bank Nv -5.59 4 -0.31 33 0.00 38 30 1
Commerzbank Ag -5.27 5 -0.96 16 0.03 12 30 1
Caja De Ahorros Del Mediterráne -4.72 6 -1.53 6 0.00 37 30 1
Banco Popolare - S.C. -4.51 7 -1.50 7 0.01 30 30 1
Danske Bank -4.50 8 -0.06 43 0.02 17 30 1
Bankinter -4.38 9 -0.94 17 0.00 40 25 14
Ing Bank Nv -4.34 10 -0.20 36 0.04 8 30 1
Deutsche Bank Ag -4.20 11 -0.21 35 0.05 5 30 1
Banco De Sabadell -4.12 12 -1.06 14 0.00 34 25 13
Banco Comercial Português -3.71 13 -1.06 15 0.00 33 27 10
Svenska Handelsbanken Ab 
(P bl)
-3.71 14 -0.00 46 0.01 19 26 12
Bank Of Ireland -3.68 15 -0.54 28 0.01 26 29 8
Abn Amro Bank Nv -3.54 16 -0.07 41 0.01 18 24 16
Dnb Nor Bank Asa -3.50 17 0.00 48 0.01 22 21 28
Irish Life And Permanent -3.38 18 -0.55 27 0.00 42 27 9
Nordea Bank Ab  -3.23 19 -0.00 44 0.02 16 23 22
Societe Generale -3.14 20 -0.33 32 0.03 11 25 15
Banco Santander S.A. -3.13 21 -0.60 26 0.04 7 23 17
Banco Pastor -3.06 22 -0.91 18 0.00 47 20 32
Swedbank Ab (Publ) -3.05 23 0.00 48 0.01 25 23 21
Banco Bpi -2.96 24 -1.28 9 0.00 41 22 25
Intesa Sanpaolo S.P.A -2.89 25 -1.18 12 0.02 13 21 26
 
 
 
Table 2. Vulnerability to GIIPS and Cumulative Stock Returns. For each publicly listed bank in our 
sample, we calculate the cumulative return between Dec 31, 1999 and Sep 16, 2011. We then regress this 
return on our measure of indirect vulnerability, controlling for direct exposure to a 50% write-off on 
GIIPS debt, bank size and leverage. Columns 1-3 report plain OLS estimates. Columns 4-6 report median 
regressions to account for outliers.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent Variable = Cumulative Stock Return: 2009/12 - 2011/9 
              
Vulnerability: V(i) 0.015*** 0.007** 0.008** 0.012** 0.009** 0.007* 
 [4.34] [2.58] [2.48] [2.68] [2.58] [1.89] 
Direct exposure to GIIPS  0.016*** 0.014***  0.010*** 0.006 
  [2.91] [2.73]  [2.70] [1.36] 
Assets / total bank assets   2.682   4.763 
   [1.45]   [1.25] 
Debt to Equity   0.003   -0.006 
   [0.38]   [-0.50] 
Constant -0.435*** -0.441*** -0.545*** -0.472*** -0.468*** -0.441 
 [-9.25] [-9.61] [-3.64] [-6.43] [-6.53] [-1.51] 
       
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 
R2 0.089 0.136 0.164       
 
Table 3.  Systemicness ranking in a response to a GIIPS shock. We calculate the contribution to 
aggregate vulnerability of each individual banks behavior, assuming a 50% write-off on GIIPS sovereign 
debt. Column 1 reports systemicness as computed in equation (8-9). Column 2 reports total exposure, in 
billions of euros. Column 3 reports the debt to equity ratio. Banks are sorted by systemicness. Only the 
25 most systemic banks are reported here. In the whole sample, correlation between size and systemicness 
is 0.47, while correlation between leverage and systemicness is 0.12. 
Rank Name 
Systemic
ness  
S(i) 
Debt to 
Equity 
(bi) 
Assets / 
Aggregat
e Equity 
(ai/E) 
Exposure 
to shock 
(eiMS) 
Linkage 
effect 
(1'AML
M'ei) 
1 Intesa Sanpaolo S.P.A 0.23 21.43 0.62 0.05 0.33 
2 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria  0.22 20.87 0.57 0.06 0.33 
3 Banco Santander S.A. 0.21 23.00 1.06 0.03 0.34 
4 Unicredit S.P.A 0.19 22.39 0.88 0.03 0.31 
5 Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena 0.17 30.00 0.22 0.08 0.32 
6 
Caja De Ahorros Y Pensiones De 
Barcelona 0.16 22.38 0.27 0.07 0.38 
7 Bfa-Bankia 0.16 28.63 0.29 0.05 0.42 
8 Bnp Paribas 0.15 22.62 1.37 0.02 0.30 
9 Societe Generale 0.07 24.56 0.75 0.01 0.32 
10 Commerzbank Ag 0.07 30.00 0.66 0.02 0.23 
11 Banco Popolare - S.C. 0.07 30.00 0.13 0.05 0.36 
12 Barclays Plc 0.06 17.52 0.90 0.01 0.34 
13 Ing Bank Nv 0.06 30.00 0.95 0.01 0.36 
14 Deutsche Bank Ag 0.06 30.00 1.15 0.01 0.30 
15 Credit Agricole 0.06 27.01 1.36 0.01 0.25 
16 Dexia 0.05 29.37 0.54 0.02 0.14 
17 Banco De Sabadell 0.04 25.26 0.10 0.04 0.40 
18 Ubi Banca 0.04 20.37 0.15 0.04 0.33 
19 Banco Comercial Português 0.04 27.16 0.10 0.04 0.34 
20 National Bank Of Greece 0.03 12.64 0.11 0.09 0.28 
21 Hsbc Holdings Plc 0.03 15.62 1.52 0.01 0.29 
22 Banco Popular Español 0.03 18.50 0.14 0.04 0.35 
23 Royal Bank Of Scotland Group Plc 0.03 18.02 1.18 0.00 0.31 
24 Caja España De Inversiones 0.03 27.38 0.05 0.09 0.28 
25 Caja De Ahorros Del Mediterráneo 0.03 30.00 0.07 0.04 0.34 
Table 4. Impact of Various Policies on Aggregate Vulnerability of European Banking Sector. The first line reports the aggregate vulnerability of 
the European banks to a 50% write-down of Greek sovereign debt (column 1), a 50% write-down of Greek, Irish, and Portugese debt (column 2), 
and a 50% write-down of Greek, Irish, Italian, Portguse, and Spanish sovereign debt (column 3). The remaining rows of the table show this 
calculation under different hypothetical policy implementations. We start by capping size of the banks, and distributing any excess assets equally 
across the remaining banks. We then cap leverage. We also consider merging some of the most systemic banks, or destroying banks with systemic 
impact greater than a certain amount. 
Policy:  Aggregate Vulnerability AV:
  Greece GIP GIIPS 
Baseline    -0.25 -0.47 -2.85
  Number of banks capped: 
Size cap (bn euros) 500 17 -0.27 -0.49 -2.81
 900 8 -0.26 -0.48 -2.84
 1300 2 -0.25 -0.47 -2.85
  Equity required: 
Cap leverage, set max D/E equal to: 15 480 -0.18 -0.32 -1.84
 20 173 -0.22 -0.40 -2.38
 25 45 -0.24 -0.45 -2.70
  Total banks merged: 
Merge banks on which a GIP shock: 50% 14 -0.29 -0.49 -2.87
  is at least xx% of equity 100% 8 -0.28 -0.48 -2.86
 150% 4 -0.26 -0.48 -2.86
  Total banks merged: 
Merge banks on which a GIP shock: Only exposed banks 8 -0.28 -0.48 -2.86
 is at least 100% of equity 
Only unexposed
banks 16 -0.25 -0.47 -2.84
 with banks totally unexposed 
Both exposed and 
unexposed 24 -0.30 -0.52 -2.89
  Total banks destroyed: 
Destroy banks with systemic impact/ own equity > xx% 100% 17 -0.31 -0.51 -2.86
 Split their assets equally among others Assets>500bn 17 -0.27 -0.49 -2.76
 Both 1 -0.25 -0.47 -2.82
Table 5. Optimal Equity Allocation to Reduce Aggregate Vulnerability to a GIIPS shock. We assume the 
social planner has 200bn euros to inject, and seeks the allocation of capital increases that maximizes the 
reduction in Aggregate Vulnerability. We only report here the top 20 receivers. Column 1 reports optimal 
equity injection in bn euros. Column 2 reports systemicness as in equation (8). Columns 3-6 provide the 
four components of systemicness as in equation (9): their product equals systemicness: debt to common 
equity ratio (col 4), total assets relative to aggregate bank equity (col. 5), bank exposure w.r.t. to the GIP 
shock (col. 6), and the linkage term (col. 7).  
Bank  
Equity 
Injection   
(bn 
euros) 
Systemic
ness 
Target 
leverage 
Size         
(ai / 
Agg. E) 
Exposur
e to GIP 
shock   
(ei'MS) 
Linkage 
effect 
(1'AML
M'ei) 
Banca Monte Dei ...Siena 18.20 0.17 30 0.22 0.08 0.32
Intesa Sanpaolo S.P.A 18.20 0.23 21.43 0.62 0.05 0.33
Caja De Ahorros Y Pensiones De 
Barcelona 17.90 0.16 22.38 0.27 0.07 0.38
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria  17.77 0.22 20.87 0.57 0.06 0.33
Bfa-Bankia 17.40 0.16 28.63 0.29 0.05 0.42
Banco Santander S.A. 12.04 0.21 22.99 1.06 0.03 0.34
Unicredit S.P.A 12.00 0.19 22.39 0.88 0.03 0.31
Banco Popolare 8.11 0.07 30.00 0.13 0.05 0.36
Bnp Paribas 6.04 0.15 22.62 1.37 0.02 0.3
Banco De Sabadell 4.68 0.04 25.26 0.10 0.04 0.4
Banco Comercial Português 4.34 0.04 27.16 0.10 0.04 0.34
Ubi Banca 4.13 0.04 20.37 0.15 0.04 0.33
Banco Popular Español 3.53 0.03 18.5 0.14 0.04 0.35
National Bank Of Greece 3.52 0.03 12.64 0.11 0.09 0.28
Efg Eurobank Ergasias  3.26 0.03 22.88 0.08 0.06 0.26
Commerzbank Ag 3.14 0.07 30.00 0.66 0.02 0.23
Bank Of Ireland 2.98 0.03 29.36 0.17 0.02 0.32
Caja De Ahorros Del 
Mediterráneo 2.96 0.03 30.00 0.07 0.04 0.34
Piraeus Bank Group 2.69 0.02 16.69 0.05 0.09 0.34
Caixa De Aforros De Galicia 2.66 0.03 30.00 0.07 0.04 0.36
 
Table 6: Robustness to Liquidation Rules. In this Table we calculate the aggregate vulnerability AV 
under three scenarios (Greek, GIP and GIIPS 50% write-down). We make 7 different assumptions on the 
liquidation rules. In line 1, we report the baseline. In line 2, we assume only sovereigns can be sold. In line 
3, we assume sovereigns and commercial real estate only can be sold. In line 4, we add mortgages to the 
list of assets that can be sold. In line 7, we include all known assets (typically about 80 % of total 
exposure). Implicitly, the different here with the first line is that we assume banks have no cash to adjust. 
 
 Greek  debt only GIP GIIPS 
Liquid assets / 
total
Benchmark -0.25 -0.47 -2.85 1.00
Sovereigns only -0.01 -0.03 -0.23 0.12
 + commercial real estate -0.04 -0.08 -0.47 0.18
 + mortgages -0.21 -0.42 -2.40 0.41
 + corporate loans -0.38 -0.71 -4.11 0.68
 + consumer loans -0.36 -0.69 -4.02 0.70
 + SME loans -0.35 -0.67 -3.84 0.75
 
  
Table 7. Risk factors used to proxy for bank holdings. The factors consist of the weekly returns on S&P 
non-financial firms, returns on US Mortgage REITs, returns on the US10yr Treasury, the return on the 
GSCI Commodities index, and the return on high yield bonds. The data span 2001 through March 2011. 
Panel A. Summary Statistics 
 Full sample Crisis period (March 2007-May 2009) 
 Mean Return (%) Volatility (%) Mean Return (%) Volatility (%) 
SP Returns 0.19 3.21 -0.28 4.55
Mortgage REITs -0.01 3.64 -0.74 5.82
US 10 yr Return -0.02 0.55 -0.05 0.69
Commodities 0.12 3.59 -0.16 4.62
High Yield Returns 0.15 1.26 -0.05 2.13
 
Panel B. Correlations 
 
SP Returns 
Mortgage 
REITs
US 10 yr 
Return Commodities 
High Yield 
Returns
SP Returns 1.00     
Mortgage REITs 0.57 1.00    
US 10 yr Return 0.28 0.07 1.00   
Commodities 0.24 0.06 0.14 1.00  
High Yield Returns 0.54 0.37 0.21 0.25 1.00
  
 Table 8. The impact of the Lehman Brothers failure on other banks. We regress stock returns on 
September 15, 2008 on V(I,Lehman) which is the impact of Lehman induced fire sales on each bank. T-
statistics are shown in brackets. 
 
 Dep. Var = Return on 
September 15, 2008 
Predicted Return from deleveraging V(i, Lehman) 1.48 1.31
 [3.04] [2.44]
Log(Size)  -0.01
  [-1.86]
Log(Leverage)  -0.09
  [-0.11]
R2 0.10 0.16
 
 
Table 9. Top 10 Systemic Banks, selected dates. We show S(i) as well as S(i)/AV. S(i) is systemicness, and is the impact of each bank on 
aggregate vulnerability AV. It is defined in Equation (9). 
 
Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 
Name S(i) 
S(i)/AV 
% of total Name S(i) 
S(i)/AV 
% of total Name S(i) 
S(i)/AV 
% of total 
AIG 0.07% 19.6% Citigroup Inc 0.66% 17.4% Wells Fargo 1.60% 20.4% 
Jpmorgan Chase  0.05% 13.6% Goldman Sachs 0.49% 12.9% Jpmorgan Chase 1.26% 16.0% 
Morgan Stanley  0.03% 7.0% Jpmorgan Chase  0.36% 9.4% Bank Of America 0.88% 11.3% 
Goldman Sachs  0.02% 5.7% FNMA 0.33% 8.6% Citigroup 0.74% 9.4% 
Lehman Brothers   0.02% 4.4% Bank Of America 0.19% 5.0% Intercontinentalexchange  0.23% 3.0% 
Metlife Inc 0.02% 4.2% AIG 0.17% 4.5% BONY Mellon 0.18% 2.2% 
Wachovia Corp  0.01% 3.3% American Express 0.13% 3.5% Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 0.18% 2.2% 
FNMA 0.01% 3.1% FHLM 0.13% 3.4% Goldman Sachs  0.15% 1.9% 
Merrill Lynch 0.01% 2.7% Lehman Brothers 0.10% 2.5% Regions Financial  0.15% 1.9% 
State Street Corp 0.01% 2.6% Metlife Inc 0.09% 2.4% Capital One Financial 0.14% 1.8% 
  
Table 10. Top 10 Vulnerable Financial Institutions, selected dates. We show vulnerability expressed as a percentage of equity value. Vulnerability is the impact of 
an aggregate shock to all factors on each single bank. We a;sp sjpw the direct exposure of each bank to the shocks considered. For each date and in each panel, we 
show the 10 most vulnerable banks in the sample. Banks are ranked by Vulnerability V(i) 
 
2007 2008 2009 
Name 
Round 0 
Exposure V(i) % Name 
Round 0 
Exposure V(i) % Name 
Round 0 
Exposure V(i) % 
Radian Group 2.31% 1.19% Radian Group 20.33% 19.43% M G I C Investment  Wis 38.09% 30.49%
AIG 1.06% 1.18% Federal National Mortgage 3.27% 11.68% Intercontinentalexchange 19.00% 24.18%
M G I C Investment  
Wi
1.75% 1.15% C B Richard Ellis Group 7.57% 9.09% American Capital Ltd 21.27% 23.94%
Sovereign Ban 0.86% 1.10% Citigroup 2.87% 8.23% C B Richard Ellis Group 11.46% 23.18%
M B I A 1.88% 0.95% Federal Home Loan Mortgage 2.07% 7.95% C M E Group 6.20% 16.47%
Ambac Financial 
G
1.12% 0.84% American Capital Ltd 3.01% 7.24% Fifth Third Ban 10.18% 15.78%
Metlife 1.26% 0.79% E Trade Financial 11.38% 6.96% Legg Mason 10.80% 14.14%
State Street 1.80% 0.76% Synovus Financial 1.90% 6.88% Regions Financial  New 14.06% 13.94%
C B Richard Ellis 
G
4.32% 0.75% Goldman Sachs Group 4.72% 6.65% Wells Fargo  New 9.43% 13.87%
Jpmorgan Chase 1.35% 0.74% Fifth Third Ban 2.11% 6.57% M B I A 8.57% 13.66%
 
 
 
Table 11. The impact of bank mergers on systemic risk. On September 25, 2008, JP Morgan Chase acquired the 
assets of Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu).  The impact of a 1% shock to the assets of bank i to total deleveraging 
is given by 1’AMLM’BAei. In Panel A, we compare the contributions of WaMu to that of JP Morgan to that of the 
hypothetical merged bank. The merged bank inherits the assets of both banks and takes on the asset-weighted capital 
structure of the original banks. We then compute hypothetical bank mergers of WaMu with each of the remaining US 
financial institutions in our sample. Panel B lists the ten safest acquirors from the perspective of systemic risk; a 
merger with each of these banks would reduce systemic risk relative to the banks operating standalone. Panel C lists 
the ten riskiest acquirors; a merger with each of these banks would increase systemic risk relative to the banks 
remaining standalone. 
 
 
Panel A: Deal Statistics 
 
 WaMu JPM Hypothetical Merged Bank
Contribution to deleveraging ($m) $7,761 $2,061 $9,060
Leverage (market) 42.609 12.746 22.781
Assumed target leverage 20 12.746 16.479
Assets, MV ($m) $313,940 $194,820 $507,760
 
 
Panel B: Safest potential acquirors from perspective of systemic risk (safest on top) 
 
Rank Name Leverage Assets ($m)
Safest BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC DEL       2.31 218,320
2 U S BANCORP DEL                  3.28 283,750
3 INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE INC     0.21 7,441
4 PROGRESSIVE CORP OH              1.17 25,764
5 ALLSTATE CORP                    5.22 160,300
6 AETNA INC NEW                    2.23 58,885
7 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP     4.11 209,170
8 BLACKROCK INC                    0.44 35,757
9 C M E GROUP INC                  0.29 35,173
10 STATE STREET CORP                5.02 157,340
 
 
Panel C: Least safe potential acquirors from perspective of systemic risk (least safe on top) 
 
 
Rank Name Leverage Assets ($m)
Least safe REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP      8.81 134,980
2 MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP  6.90 60,469
3 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP              9.33 112,710
4 WACHOVIA CORP  17.49 748,800
5 B B & T CORP                     5.30 142,590
6 SUNTRUST BANKS INC               7.73 182,960
7 KEYCORP NEW                      12.53 99,597
8 POPULAR INC                      13.03 44,163
9 ASSOCIATED BANC CORP             5.82 22,568
10 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP      11.92 37,805
 
